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Constitutional Law-Attorney's Loyalty Fitness 
Plaintiff-law students challenged, primarily on first and four-
teenth amendment vagueness and overbreadth grounds, New 
York's system for screening bar applicants. New York statutes 
and rules require generally that the defendants (appellate divi-
sion of the state supreme court and, preliminarily, committees 
on character and fitness) " ... be satisfied that [an applicant] 
possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an at-
torney .... " Specifically, however, the committees require af-
fidavits from two acquaintances of the applicant and the latter's 
completion of a questionnaire, followed by a personal inter-
view. Finally, each applicant must swear or affirm that he will 
support the constitutions of the United States and the state of 
New York. Rule 9406 of the New York Civil Practice Law re-
flects these requirements in directing the committees not to 
certify an applicant for admission " ... unless he shall furnish 
satisfactory proof . . . that he believes in the form of the govern-
ment of the United States and is loyal to such government." Two 
questions in the applicant's questionnaire ask whether (a) 
the- applicant had ever helped organize or had joined any or-
ganization known by him to advocate unlawful overthrow of 
the United States or any state government, with specific intent 
on the applicant's part to further such an objective, and (b) 
whether the applicant could take the supportive loyalty oath con-
scientiously and without mental reservation. Plaintiffs attacked 
this procedure as invalid on its face and as applied, not because 
of any unjustifiable denial of bar admission but on the ground 
that the screening system works a "chilling effect" upon the ex-
ercise of law students' free speech, belief, and association. The 
three-judge United States District Court found certain minor 
imperfections in the questionnaire, but otherwise sustained the 
screening statutes and rules as valid. On appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, affirmed (5-4). The Court held (1) that 
Rule 9406, as consistently and narrowly interpreted by the New 
York judges and committees, imposed on plaintiffs no impermis-
sible burden of proof or invalid scope of inquiry into their politi-
cal beliefs, requiring no more than a willingness to take the con-
stitutional oath in good faith; and (2) that the questionnaire in-
quiries into an applicant's organizational activity and scienter 
are "precisely tailored to conform to the relevant decisions of this 
Court." Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. 
Wadmond, 401U.S.154 (1971). 
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Clearly a state may require bar applicants to possess the 
good "character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and 
counsellor-at-law."1 Presently every state, as well as the District 
of Columbia, requires "good moral character" or something 
comparable.2 The United States Supreme Court requires of ap-
plicants for admission to its bar that "their private and profes-
sional characters shall appear to be good."3 Also there is no re-
maining doubt that an applicant may constituti9nally be re-
quired to state his allegiance to the United States and state con-
stitutions.4 The Court, however, has invalidated a number of 
loyalty oaths going beyond a simple affirmation demanding, 
in effect, complete freedom from subversive bel.ief, associa-
tion, and activity. 5 In Wadmond there was little doubt of the 
oath's validity per se. 6 The main question litigated in Wad-
mond was the validity of Rule 94067 and two related questions 
on the required applicant questionnaire.8 The Court conceded 
that Rule 9406 on its face raised substantial constitutional ques-
1. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238 (1957). 
The New Mexico Bar refused to permit an applicant to take the bar 
examination on the grounds that the applicant had not shown "good 
moral character." Mr. Justice Black, writing for the court which de-
termined the applicant's former Communist Party membership insufff-
cient to show lack of good moral character, said, "A State cannot ex-
clude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in 
a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process Clause or Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [citations] A State 
can require high standards of qualifications, such as good moral char-
acter or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar; 
but any qualification must have a rational connection with the appli-
cant's fitness or capacity to practice law." See also Note, The New 
Mexico Bar Admission Loyalty Oath: A Study in Unconstitutionality; 
9 NAT RES. J. 248 (1969). . 
2. See generally 5 1971 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DmECTORY 
(103d ed. 1970). 
3. U.S. SUP. CT. RuLE 5 (1). 
4. Hosack v. Smiley, 390 U.S. 744 (1968); Knight v. Board of Re-
gents, 390 U.S. 36 (1968). 
5. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); 
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 
(1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
6. "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Con-
stitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of New 
York, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of ... , 
according to the best of my ability." N.Y. CONST., art. XIII, § 1; N.Y. 
JUDICIARY LAW§ 466 (McKinney 1968). 
7. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAw AND RULES, RUle 9406 (McKinney 1963). 
8. The defendants had already, both before and after commence-
ment of this litigation, eliminated or revised certain questions to which 
plaintiffs had originally raised objections. Other questions were ordered 
revised or eliminated by the district court. 
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tions both as to the burden of proof permissible under the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and as to the per-
missible scope of inquiry into an applicant's political beliefs un-
der the first and fourteenth. In Speiser v. RandaU9 it was held 
as a matter of procedural due process that a state may not even 
place on an applicant for tax exemption the burden of proving 
that he has not engaged in criminal activity. The Court in 
Wadmond concluded however that there was no true burden of 
proof, in the sense of a burden persuasion, imposed upon the ap-
plicant, but only the lighter burden of going forward with the 
evidence which could be satisfied by his answering two ques-
tions on the questionnaire. 
In Elfbrandt v. Russell10 , the Court declared that a statute 
which, touches the protected rights of the first and fourth 
amendments must be narrowly drawn. Legislative goals cannot 
be pursued by means which broadly stifle fundamental personal 
liberties. NAACP v. Button11 declared "the threat of sanc-
tions may deter . . . almost as potently as the actual applica-
tion of sanctions." The dangers of this "chilling effect" upon the 
exercise of vital first amendment rights must be guarded against 
by sensitive legislation which clearly informs as to what is being 
proscribed. Without appearing to disturb these precedents 
however, the Court in Wadmond, held the screening inquiries 
proper. Accepting defendants' narrow construction, regardless 
of the meaning that might have been given Rule 9406 and the key 
questionnaire inquiries by the Court itself, the Court reasoned 
that if the defendants are regarded as state courts, the United 
States Supreme Court was bound by the defendants' construction; 
and if the defendants are viewed as state administrative agencies 
charged with enforcement and construction of the Rule, the de-
fendants' interpretation is at least entitled to "respectful consid-
eration."12 
As urged in the dissents of both Mr. Justice Marshall and 
9. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
10. 384 U.S. 11 (1966). 
11. 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
12. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Kingsley Int. 
Pie. Corp. v. Regents of N.Y.U., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959); Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958); Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 
96 ( 1935). The majority accepted the narrow construction of Rule 
9406 offered by the defendants' (the Committees on Character and 
Fitness and their members and two appellate divisions and their 
judges). But see Justice Marshall's dissent where he argues that prior 
to the Wadmond litigation it appears that defendants thought it was 
their duty to make virtually unlimited inquiry into an applicant's as-
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Mr. Justice Black, this rationale appears to conflict with Bond v. 
Floyd,13 where the Court refused to allow a majority of state 
legislators to test the sincerity with which another duly-elected 
legislator can swear to uphold the Constitution. The majority, 
however, declared that "at the most, the Rule as authoritatively 
interpreted . . . performs only the function of ascertaining that 
an applicant is not one who swears to an oath proforma while de-
claring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to 
the oath,"14 and that such inquiry falls into the area left permis-
sible by Bond. 
Plaintiffs challenged the questionnaire as requiring disclo-
sure of acts and associations beyond the state's constitutionally 
permissible scope of inquiry. Only two numbered questions15 
were in dispute: 
26. (a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or 
become a member of any organization or group of persons 
which, during the period of your membership or association, you 
knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the 
United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof 
should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence, or 
any unlawful means? -- If your answer is in the affirma-
tive, state the facts below. 
(b). If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, 
during the period of such membership or association, have the 
specific intent to further the aims of such organization or group 
of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the 
United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof 
by force, violence or any unlawful means? 
27. (a) Is there any reason why you cannot take and sub-
scribe to an oath of affirmation that you will support the con-
stitutions of the United States and of the State of New York? If 
there is, please explain. 
(b) Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you 
are, without any mental reservation, loyal to and ready to sup-
port the Constitution of the United States? --
The Court refused plaintiffs' argument and declared that both 
questions were legitimate inquiries. 
The majority of the Court has recently been more restric-
sociational, political, and journalistic activities. See also Judge Motley's 
dissenting opinion in the Wadmond litigation in the lower court, Law 
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 
117, 137-139 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
13. 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
14. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 
401 U.S. 154, 163 (1971). 
15. The lower court had ordered all other questions revised or 
eliminated and only two questions (both revised by the district court) 
remained in dispute. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401U.S.154, 164 (1971). 
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tive about the permissible scope and coverage of oath and in-
vestigative provisions.16 This view is reflected in Baird v. State 
Bar of Arizona11 and In Re Stolar,18 two bar admission denial 
cases decided the same day as the principal case. In Baird and 
Stolar, the Court refused to allow denials of admission to prac-
tice law for refusals to answer questions relating to applicants' 
beliefs about government and their affiliations with organiza-
tions suspected of advocating unlawful overthrow, on the ground 
that such denials contravene first amendment protections. In 
Baird, Mt. Justice Black, writing for the majority with three 
Justices concurring and one Justice concurring in the result, de-
clared "[t]he First Amendment's protection of association pro-
hibits a State from excluding a person from a profession or 
punishing him solely because ... he holds certain beliefs."19 
When a state seeks to inquire about an individual's beliefs and 
associations, a heavy burden lies upon it to show that the in-
quiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state interest. And 
whatever justification may be offered, a state may not inquire 
about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of 
withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes.20 
Prima facie, the disputed provisions in Wadmond seem replete 
with the same defects which were fatal to the questionnaires in 
Baird and Stolar. Two differences, however, were apparently 
decisive. The majority in Wadmond, unlike Baird and Stolar, 
emphasized that no person before the Court had actually been 
refused admission to the New York Bar. Secondly, defendants 
in Wadmond proffered, in defense of New York's screening proc-
ess, evidence of a restrictive interpretation and application of 
the broadly-drawn admission criteria rather than an attempt to 
16. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt 
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); 
Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). See Brown 
and Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 
480 (1953); Countryman, Loyalty Tests for Lawyers, 13 LAw. GUILD 
REV. 149 (1953); Frankel, Law and Loyalty, 37 IowA L. REV. 153 (1951); 
Koenigsberg and Stavis, Test Oaths: Henry VIII to the American Bar 
Association, 11 LAw. GUILD REV. 111 (1951); Note, The New Mexico 
Bar Admission Loyalty Oath: A Study in Unconstitutionality, 9 NAT. 
REs. J. 248 (1969); Comment, Constitutional Law-Loyalty Oaths, 20 
S. CAL. L. REV. 333 (1968); Comment, California's Application Forms for 
Admission to Practice Law and the First Amendment, 55 CALIF. L. 
REV. 407 (1967). 
17. 401 U.S. 1 (1971). 
18. 401 U.S. 23 (19'11). 
19. 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). 
20. Ibid. 
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justify the statutes on their face. 
One may reasonably conclude that a state may escape invali-
dation of a statute which apparently exceeds permissible Bill of 
Rights limits if the state shows that the statute does not opera-
tively mean what it appears to say, but rather requires only an 
allegiance to the Constitution, and secondly, that a state may 
properly make inquiries to determine the oath affirmant's sin-
cerity and good faith. 
W. WADE BERRYiilLL 
